تولید و پرداخت های مدیریتی: MVA و EVA به عنوان عوامل تعیین کننده غرامت اجرائی

Designing effective compensation contracts has become increasingly complex due to the globalization of the executive work force and the multitude of incentive schemes. We examine the relationships between managerial pay and firm performance among domestic and global firms using economic value added (EVA) and market value added (MVA) to assess wealth creation. Our work suggests that top managers in domestic- and globally focused firms are not only incented to increase EVA, but also rewarded for past additions to MVA. The results of our research suggest that managers of highly globalized firms tend to be paid at higher levels, reflecting the increased complexity of managing global firms.

Previous studies have proposed that optimal executive compensation contracts perfectly align the interests of the executives with those of the firm's shareholders Grossman & Hart, 1983 and Harris & Raviv, 1979. In theory, such contracts act as incentive mechanisms for executives to engage in behaviors that maximize the firm's value and reward executives for such behavior Fama, 1980 and Jensen & Meckling, 1976. Whether executive compensation contracts meet this test of optimality, ex ante or ex post, is an empirical question subject to ongoing investigation (Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000).

We investigate the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance using cross-sectional regression analysis. The dependent variables in all our cross-sectional regressions are the three components of compensation (salary, bonus and TDC) adjusted for firm size. For brevity, we refer to compensation components generically as COMP. In all regressions, the t statistics are based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent estimators of the standard errors of the model's parameters.