تقویت نظم و انضباط در بازار بانک ها و درست کردن زمین بازی: آیا این دو سازگار اند؟؟

This paper examines whether the supervisory objective of strengthening market discipline is compatible with the one of enhancing competitive equality for internationally active banks. This issue is empirically investigated by comparing the determinants of major US and European banks' subordinated notes and debentures (SND) spreads. Three main results emerge. First, the spread/rating relationship is both statistically significant and very similar for US and European banks' bonds. Second, US banks tend to pay a higher average spread on their SND issues because of a poorer average rating. This is due to the presence of European public sector banks, i.e. banks which are either government owned or benefit from explicit government guarantees. In fact, US banks have slightly better Moody's bank financial strength and FitchIBCA individual average ratings, which omit the influence of government and other external support on risk borne by investors. Finally, controlling for the issuing banks' default risk, US banks pay a statistically significant lower average spread on their SND issues. This result is attributed to the higher liquidity of the US market for banks' bonds.

During the last 15 years, an increasing attention has been devoted by bank supervisors and regulatory economists to the issue of market discipline. While different opinions exist on the best way to achieve it, most observers agree that bank supervisors should increasingly rely on market forces to supplement their traditional supervisory methods. As recently outlined by the General Manager of the Bank of International Settlements and Chairman of the Financial Stability Forum:1

Three main results emerge from the empirical analysis presented in this study. First, the spread/rating relationship is very similar and statistically significant for US and European banks' SND issues. Second, US banks tend to pay a higher average spread on their bonds because of a poorer average rating. This result is attributed to the significant presence of public sector banks, i.e. banks which are either government owned or benefit from explicit government guarantees, in the European banking system. In fact, US banks have better MBFS and FII average ratings, which omit the influence of government and other external support on risk borne by investors. Finally, controlling for the issuing banks' risk profiles, US banks pay a statistically significant slightly lower average spread on their SND issues. This result is attributed to the higher liquidity of the US secondary market for banks' bonds.