تجزیه و تحلیل عناصر تشکیل دهنده B2B روابط نام مشترک تجاری

The proliferation of co-branding in consumer markets has been given considerable attention in the literature, yet attention to the practice in business-to-business markets has been limited, despite the growing attention to the role of relationships in the B2B arena. In an examination of co-branding in the industrial sector, this paper discusses the use of ingredient co-branding and uses an econometric modeling approach to offer a rationale for why it occurs. The analysis provides insight into why downstream manufacturers participate in a relationship that strengthens the supplier's position in the market. We find that under the threat to the supplier of entry from a competitor whose costs are unobservable, co-branding relationships will be entered into resulting in a reduced probability of entry. This co-branding arrangement benefits both the incumbent supplier and the downstream manufacturer. The incumbent supplier benefits from the reduced probability of competitor entry, and the downstream manufacturer is rewarded with a lower price. Further, we find that the cost of the co-branded product is lower, due to a mitigation of double marginalization in a vertically-integrated solution. We examine co-branding relationships with and without advertising support and find that co-branding relationships with advertising support tend to be superior.

Co-branding is the strategy of presenting two or more independent brands jointly on the same product or service. It has been referred to by many different terms, including co-marketing, joint branding, brand alliances, and symbiotic marketing (Abratt & Motlana, 2002). Co-branding is adopted for various reasons including, to provide operational benefits, to gain the advantage of “spill over” effects on each individual brand, and to gain a competitive advantage by increasing the attractiveness of the combined offering to the downstream customer. In a co-branding relationship between a manufacturer and a supplier specifically, the manufacturer aims to leverage the strength of both brands in the marketplace, and to profit from their individual and combined marketing efforts and brand strengths. In most cases, co-branding occurs when both brands are relatively well-established and when there is a distinctive advantage to be gained by combining the strengths of both brands. Co-branding increasingly is becoming a major marketing strategy, as a growing number of products are sold with branded ingredients (Prince and Davies, 2002, Septembe, Cooke and Ryan, 2000 and Washburn et al., 2004). It has been used to maximize utilization of an organization's brand assets, generate new revenues, enter new markets, create barriers to entry from competitors, share costs and risks, increase profit margins, and widen current markets (Rao and Ruekert, 1994, Park et al., 1996 and American Productivity & Quality Center Report, 2001). Co-branding relationships are commonly categorized into four major types: ingredient co-branding, composite/complementary co-branding, licensed co-branding, and umbrella co-branding. In this paper, we primarily are interested in ingredient co-branding, i.e., the B2B relationship between the manufacturer and the supplier in which the end product of the supplier becomes one of the components of the manufacturer's offering. For example, Dell (the manufacturer) has a co-branding relationship with Intel (the supplier) in the marketing of computer servers (Intel, 2006 and Wikipedia, 2006). Both manufacturer and supplier enjoy the benefits of the relationship that include mutual co-operation, shared knowledge, and risk sharing. In addition, Dell may enjoy an enhanced market reputation, while Intel may benefit by reducing the probability of entry by competitors. Dell receives a preferential price from Intel, while Intel enjoys a stable, long-term customer. Intel provides advertising support for Dell and co-branding incentives, some of which are passed on to the final customer in the form of lower prices. In the aerospace industry, Boeing (the manufacturer) has a co-branding relationship with GE (the supplier), whose jet engines are clearly of strategic importance to Boeing (Pyke, 1998). On one hand, by highlighting its use of GE engines, Boeing potentially increases end-user trust in its airplane, consequently generating demand by airlines (the buyers). On the other hand, GE potentially increases the reputation of its product due to the fact that its engines are used by one of the world's leading airplane manufacturers. The synergism of this relationship is reinforced by support from a current GE ad. It states that GE exclusively supplies the GE90-115B engine, “the latest and world's most powerful jet engine”, for Boeing's long-range 777 aircraft. In the polycarbonate market, Data Track (the manufacturer) has a co-branding relationship in the marketing of compact discs with its supplier, Bayer's Makrolon. Makrolon, a high-tech plastic from Bayer Polymers, had approximately a thirty percent market share in the global polycarbonate market in 2002 (Bayer Annual Report, 2002). This impressive performance in the market came partly from the successful co-branding strategy started in 2000. The “Made of Makrolon®” logo helped its manufacturer partners convey the idea that the material used in their CDs and DVDs guarantees superior storage security and quality (Bayer Annual Report, 2002). In turn, this helped Bayer keep competitors at bay and build its reputation. Other examples of manufacturer–supplier co-branding relationships include Symantec (manufacturer)/US Robotics (supplier) and IBM (manufacturer)/Siebel (supplier). The essence of B2B co-branding centers on relationships, alliances, and networks. These brand partnerships or alliances allow companies to endorse each other, engage in co-operative branding activities, and build relationships and networks that enhance themselves in the marketplace (Bengtsson & Servais, 2005). The benefits of such alliances are well-demonstrated by Bengtsson and Servais in an empirical case analysis of a co-branding alliance between two companies, DEVI and JUNKERS. In addition to the relationship benefits highlighted by Bengtsson and Servais, some of the other benefits (see Table 1) include competitive benefits (e.g., suppliers may benefit by reducing the probability of competitive entry), cost benefits (e.g., suppliers may reward manufacturers with lower prices in return for reduced competitive entry), double-marginalization benefits (e.g., the cost of the co-branded offering can potentially be lower due to the elimination of two separate margins being passed down to the final customer), and advertising support benefits (e.g., the supplier provides advertising support to the manufacturer). Moreover, it is these relatively unique “tangible” aspects of an “ingredient” co-branding relationship between a manufacturer and a supplier that are the focus of this paper. For an understanding of B2C brand alliances, a strategy not involving joint-branding efforts as in co-branding, see Erevelles, Horton and Fukawa (2007).

B2B ingredient co-branding relationships are increasingly being used as a viable marketing strategy. Despite this, there is relatively little research that addresses B2B ingredient co-branding relationships and outcomes. This paper is an initial examination of these relationships between manufacturers and suppliers. We used an econometric modeling approach to explain why manufacturers and suppliers engage in co-branding relationships. In the process, we provide some answers for why downstream manufacturers participate in a relationship that may strengthen the supplier's position in the marketplace. We find that when faced with the threat of entry from a competitor whose costs are unobservable, suppliers enter into co-branding relationships with manufacturers that result in a reduced probability of entry of the competitor. In return for this reduced probability of entry of its competitors, the supplier rewards the manufacturer with a lower price in the co-branding relationship. We also find that due to the mitigation of double marginalization; the cost of the co-branded product can potentially be lower, resulting in a possible benefit to the downstream customer. Thus, co-branding relationships involving a contracted-upon wholesale price and penalty for switching results in a quasi-vertically-integrated outcome, that may enhance channel coordination. We also find that co-branding relationships with advertising support are superior to those without advertising support. This paper makes several contributions to the extant literature. First, it provides a theoretical and managerial reason for the rationale behind ingredient co-branding relationships. An examination of past literature reveals that this basic justification for co-branding has never been substantiated. This paper thus lays a foundation for further development of both theory and practice in the area. Second, this paper provides an explanation for the seemingly counter-intuitive phenomena in which manufacturers participate in co-branding relationships that strengthen the supplier's position in the marketplace. It appears that they do so because it could potentially increase both their demand and profit margins. Third, we propose that from the perspective of the downstream customer, co-branding may actually serve to reduce prices. While once again, this may seem to be a counter-intuitive notion, we suggest that it is not, and offer that the elimination of double marginalization in the channel may serve to reduce prices. Fourth, we provide theoretical support for the idea that co-branding relationships with brand investment (advertising support) by the supplier are superior to those without brand investment. This is an important initial contribution, as it represents the reality in most co-branding relationships, and to the best of our knowledge, has not been modeled before. Fifth, most of the extant academic literature on co-branding has concentrated on co-branding in consumer markets. Our paper is one of the few that has examined ingredient co-branding relationships in a B2B context. Sixth, our conclusions seem to lend further support to the move away from “transactional” relationships in channels to closer and more permanent “transvectional” relationships (see Erevelles and Stevenson, 2006 and Alderson and Martin, 1965). Our contribution should not, however, be overstated. Our model represents an initial foray into the realm of B2B co-branding relationships. Co-branding relationships in the B2B marketplace are varied and complex. It is unclear from our discussion, for example, how our conclusions would be different if the manufacturer has considerably more “market power” and brand strength than the supplier. Similarly, it is unclear what would happen if a competitive entrant (supplier) has a vastly superior product or a new disruptive technology that in effect renders the incumbent supplier obsolete. Clearly, research is needed to further clarify such issues and better study the phenomena from different angles.