مدیریت بانک و نظم و انضباط در بازار

In recent years, market discipline has attracted interest as a mechanism to augment or replace government regulation of the financial sector and, especially, depository institutions. The ability to substitute market discipline for bank regulation is of much interest and we use a theoretical model to examine it. In a stylized comprehensive model, we incorporate the characteristics of the regulatory structure and examine the effects of different parameters on the optimal decisions of the bank. These parameters include changes in risk, deposit-insurance coverage, and degree of market discipline. Interesting results include the following: (1) an increase in competition should result in less equity financing, higher deposit interest rates, and higher risk premiums (spreads); (2) exogenous shocks, such as an increase in oil prices, will result in more equity financing; (3) the sensitivity of the two types of deposits will react to a change in market discipline in opposite ways. Our theoretical results are consistent with empirical evidence in recent studies.

Stakeholders in a firm can monitor and control the firm's behavior using market mechanisms. The ability of stakeholders, including debt holders and stockholders, to influence the cost and quantity of funds available to the firm and the valuation of its assets provides a market-based structure for corporate governance (market discipline). Market discipline is considered optimal for corporate governance, as is evident in unregulated industries. However, this paradigm of governance, particularly when employed by debt holders, may not apply to financial institutions and, especially, to highly regulated depository institutions. Since most liabilities of smaller or medium depository institutions are deposits or privately held debt that are not traded in the market, debt holders lack opportunities to examine the performance of managers and, therefore, cannot exercise market discipline. This information asymmetry is a particular problem for depository institutions, since bank managers practice the opaque business of making confidential bank loans. Moreover, the same government that does much to govern these institutions by means of regulatory and supervisory mechanisms also guarantees a large part of the depositories’ liabilities. Wherever deposit insurance is in effect, depositors have no incentive to monitor the bank. The information asymmetry and lack of in

This paper focuses on market discipline, which we define as the direct effect of the riskiness of a bank's assets and capital structure on the cost of its funds. We suggest that the degree of market discipline be defined and measured as the sensitivity (elasticity) of the cost of uninsured deposits with respect to the capital structure adjusted to the risk of the bank's assets. It turns out that the degree of market discipline plays an important role in the management of banks. Within a stylized comprehensive model of the optimal behavior of a bank, we incorporate the characteristics of the regulatory structure and market discipline. Government regulation is introduced via deposit insurance that is provided to some depositors. We examine and derive the effects of several parameters on the optimal behavior of the bank and relate them to recent developments in US banking. Our main results are: (1) an increase in the insurance premium, or the adjustment of this premium to risk, will result in an increase in equity financing and a decline in interest rates paid on deposits; (2) an increase in market discipline and a decrease in risk (an increase in probability of solvency) will have a similar effect. By the same token, an increase in the cost of equity and an increase in competition in the insured-deposits market will cause equity financing to decline and the rate paid on insured deposits to increase.