قوانین و مقررات مالی در تنظیم بحران، نظم و انضباط بازار، کنترل داخلی: سه آشفتگی بزرگ
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|15521||2010||17 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : International Economics, Volume 123, March 2010, Pages 13–29
The financial crisis has revealed the dysfunction of all banking and financial regulatory mechanisms. Prudential regulation failed to prevent the meltdown. Market discipline neglected to send any warning signals. Internal control was seriously undermined by doubtful dealings, in France as elsewhere. Does the crisis call the big three into question? No regulation mechanism is omniscient, whether it be state, market or self-regulation. As such, none of three can operate without the other two, with the corollary that they can only function together. It means that splitting up the big three can therefore not be the answer to the crisis. By contrast, since each one of them has shown its weaknesses, the only solution is to work on reinforcing each one. Unfortunately there is no guarantee that the reforms go far enough.
The financial crisis, born in the summer of 2007 and still arguably alive in 2010, has revealed the dysfunction of all banking and financial regulatory mechanisms. Prudential regulation failed to prevent the meltdown. Market discipline neglected to send any warning signals – low risk premiums, high ratings. Internal control was seriously undermined in France by doubtful dealings such as the Société Générale, Caisse d'épargne and Madoff affairs on a larger scale. The big three are nevertheless the basis for today's financial regulation and this situation is the result of a slow process of evolution. The reforms that gave rise to “financial safety nets” in the 1930s in the United States – e.g. the 1933 Banking Act – then in post-war Europe and in Japan were all initially inspired by the desire to replace dysfunctional market regulation. The resurgence of economic imbalances in the 1970s did, however, give financial operations a massive shot in the arm. Three factors brought about new financial needs and prompted the creation of new financial products and new markets: first, the petrodollars from the oil-price shocks, recycling surpluses from oil-producing countries; second, the unstable interest rates subsequent to post oil-price shock inflation and the monetary change in course in the United States in 1979 with Paul Volker's arrival as head of the Fed; and third
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Above and beyond attempting to show that we do not advocate breaking up the big three, but rather reinforcing them in each of their axes, i.e. prudential regulation, internal control and market discipline, the question arises of the institutions that financial regulation functions around. Despite the crisis and the reforms that it helped launch, there has not been much institutional evolution on an international scale. Most supervisory structure reforms have been strictly national (see the Deletré Report and the Report of the Group of 30). France and Belgium have for example begun reforms of their supervisory systems which date back to before the crisis. These two countries are planning to move toward a twin-peaks organization: supervision of financial go-betweens, such as banks, insurance, securities managers, under the control of a single authority, with monitoring of markets and of the conduct of business under that of a second authority. In this regard, the crisis seems to have highlighted the need not to mix up prudential supervision and conduct of business