نظم و انضباط بازار، بحران مالی و تغییرات نظارتی: شواهدی از بانک های اندونزی

Following the 1997/1998 financial crisis, Indonesian banks experienced major regulatory changes, including the adoption of the blanket guarantee scheme (BGS) in 1998, a limited guarantee (LG) in 2005, and changes in capital regulation in 1998 and 2001. We examine the impact of these regulatory changes on market discipline during the period 1995–2009. The price of deposits is used to measure market discipline in a dynamic panel data methodology on a sample of 104 commercial banks. We find a weakening of market discipline following the introduction of the BGS. The result is consistent with the deposit insurance scheme being credible in the lower capital requirement environment. The adoption of LG in a recovering economy also mitigates the role of market discipline. However, market discipline is more pronounced in listed banks than unlisted banks and in foreign banks than domestic banks. These results have important implications for banking regulation and supervision, particularly during a crisis period.

The current global financial crisis suggests that banking authorities need to improve the effectiveness of all disciplining factors of bank risk taking. Gueyie and Lai (2003), for example, argue that the disciplining factors of bank risk taking include regulatory discipline, bank self discipline (charter value), and market discipline. Indeed, a number of studies have examined the role of market discipline in controlling bank risk and market discipline is one of the three pillars in the capital adequacy framework of the Basel Accord II.1 Studies of market discipline on banks have been conducted in both developed and developing countries over different time periods. We continue the research by examining how market discipline was affected by regulatory changes following the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis. Hence, our results provide important insights for banking authorities in developing policy responses to financial or economic crises.

We test for the presence of market discipline on Indonesian banks during 1995–2009, and the impact of three major regulatory changes. Using a balanced panel of 104 commercial banks, we find evidence of market discipline as higher deposit rates are associated with higher default risk and liquidity risk. We find an inverse relation between depositor interest rates and BGS and CAR. This is consistent with the insurance scheme being perceived as credible and the lower CAR signaling reduced likelihood of bank closures resulting in a weakening of market discipline.20 These two complementary signals reduce the need for market discipline. In the subsequent LG environment, improved economic conditions and the strengthening of banks mitigated the need for market discipline. Therefore, our study is consistent with Martínez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001, Önder and Özyildirim, 2003 and Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004, who argue that government guarantees reduce market discipline, particularly if the guarantees are perceived to be credible. However, our findings are inconsistent with Hosono et al. (2005) who argue that the BGS in Indonesia did not achieve credibility. Also, we document that the evidence of market discipline is more pronounced in listed banks than unlisted banks, and in foreign banks than domestic banks.