ساختار مالکیت، نظم و انضباط بازار و ریسک پذیری انگیزه های بانک تحت بیمه سپرده

The paper studies the effects of market discipline by creditors and ownership structure on banks’ risk taking in the presence of partial deposit insurance. An agency-cost model explains how the effects of creditor discipline and shareholder control are interdependent, the non-monotonic effect of shareholder control, and the role of leverage. Panel regressions on several hundred banks worldwide 1995–2005 confirm a negative individual risk effect of creditor discipline and the expected convex effect of shareholder control. Increased shareholder control significantly strengthens the negative effect of market discipline on asset risk, but joint effects on overall default risk are limited.

The determinants of bank risk-taking and the optimal design of the safety-net arrangements relied upon to safeguard banking-system stability (such as deposit insurance) have been the objects of considerable research efforts within the banking literature. Progressively, the safety-net arrangements have themselves come to be widely recognized as important determinants of the risk-taking incentives of banks, particularly bank shareholders. But because different bank stakeholder groups are differently affected by safety-net arrangements, not only the arrangements as such, but also corporate governance factors (such as ownership structure and the control powers associated with different types of stake in the bank) matter for banks’ risk-taking behavior. The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of two specific governance factors – market discipline by the bank’s creditors and equity ownership structure – on the relationship between safety-net characteristics (as represented by deposit insurance coverage) and bank risk taking.

This paper analyzes and tests the combined effects of market discipline by creditors and ownership structure on banks’ risk-taking incentives in the presence of (partial) deposit insurance. As is well known, the existence of deposit insurance reduces market discipline by the bank’s creditors, and introduces a subsidy on increased risk, but the size of this subsidy depends on the agency cost structure of the bank, and therefore on its ownership structure. I introduce a simple agency-cost model to account for the main effects. In the model, the extent of market discipline by creditors is defined in terms of the share of debt credibly exempt from insurance. The structure of equity ownership – insofar as it is related to the extent to which (outside) shareholders can enforce their interests – affects both equity and debt agency costs. The main contribution of the model is twofold. First, it incorporates a number of important results from the banking literature in a standard corporate governance framework. So, in particular, is the source of the moral-hazard effect of deposit insurance the standard owner-creditor conflict of interest, and the source of the interdependence between market discipline and ownership structure is the agency conflict between owners and managers. Second, it allows for a straightforward analytic derivation of the effects of the governance variables on bank risk-taking.