مدیریت شیلات بازارمحور منطقه ای، تجزیه و تحلیل از ماهی چهار منطقه در اقیانوس اطلس شمالی

What influence do exchange methods have on ex-vessel prices and what are the potential implications for the regional management of the fisheries? This paper undertakes an empirical analysis of exchange methods and ex-vessel prices for specific demersal fish controlled for fish size and quantity in four North Atlantic regions, including Iceland, North-Norway and Scotland. The methodology consists of a comparative analysis of total average price (TAP) and Anova analysis of monthly average prices of cod and plaice landed fresh during the period 1990–1999. Scotland's auctions have the highest TAPs for the species analysed whilst the lowest TAPs are returned from contract sales in Iceland and North-Norway. Icelandic auctions and Møre–Romsdal auctions adopt intermediate positions in this price hierarchy. Price differences are still present even when correcting for factors such as legal barriers, transport costs from different geographical locations, exchange fees and seasonal variations in supplies. The implications of these findings for current and prospective systems of regional resource and coastal management are then considered and the scope and need for further study is established.

Historically a number of different methods of first hand sale have been established around the globe to determine the price paid for the fish catch. As fish supply constraints tighten it is increasingly important, to understand how price and the value added might be influenced, if at all, by the exchange method employed. Not least is the core fact that fishermen's propensity to fish and economic performance will depend upon the market value obtained from their effort. Contemporary economic problems resultant from the failure of fisheries resource management systems to correct excess levels of fishing effort are well documented in the literature [1], [2] and [3]. The vast majority of this work has been focused upon cost-reducing issues pertaining to resource management allocation systems, regulation of fishing effort, enforcement of management measures and their consequences for rent, industrial structure and the adjacent dependent regions and their populations. Research endeavours, from a variety of perspectives, have sought to improve profitability whilst dealing with the core issue of declining catches failing to maintain a sustained level of output sufficient to satisfy income demands and aspirations within the industry. Notwithstanding the importance of these phenomena it may be argued that this focus has tended to neglect the central role of price in resource management and the fundamental importance of price as a key determinant of fishers’ incomes and by that, regional economic development. Prices are of course dependent upon the willingness of buyers (and ultimately consumers) to pay for delivery of the right quality and quantity of specified species at given times and locations. Whilst we recognise the importance of buyer preferences, space constraints necessitate that this paper concentrates more explicitly on their aggregate interaction with the supply determinants of price. Fishers fish to earn income rather than just catch a specified, or maximum, quantity of fish. Although sometimes the fishers behaviour may suggest otherwise [4], [5] and [6]. In fact concentration on the quantity of fish caught rather than the unit value has been encouraged by some of the resource management schemes emplaced, perversely to improve the profitability of the fisheries [7]. Theoretical losses of open-access or regulated open-access fisheries are presented in Wilen and Homans [8] and Trondsen [4]. However, if sustainable levels of fishing effort are to be realised, this would suggest that rather than just focus upon ways to reduce or stabilise the quantity of fish removed, be this by effort restriction, limits on quotas or whatever, alternative mechanisms must also be sought which might give incentives for economic development in the fishery regions. One method of moderating the negative effects of such management systems is to concentrate on ways in which the unit price of the resource might be increased. If higher unit values can be realised for the fish landed, fishers should be able to retain current income levels with reduced catches (and conceivably may achieve even higher incomes) but importantly, not necessarily at the cost of excessive catch levels. The concept of market-oriented value adding (MOVA) is not new of course, but traditionally the emphasis of value adding has been placed upon raw material transformation into products that incorporate the wide array of attributes sought by fish consumers. Fishers may process live fish into many different products as whole, gutted, fillets, heads, cheeks, tongue, liver, stomach and bones. Through processing, each product can be differentiated into various sizes and conservation forms where each product has its own product-market segment. The total market value fishers gain from the live catch is therefore both dependent on satisfying buyer preferences in a variety of different marketing chains and power position in the marketing chain [9]. Within this arena attention has been focused upon factors pertaining to consumption. A considerable body of work has evolved in connection with consumers’ substitution between different fish products, in particular concerning the impact of expanded aquaculture products [10], [11], [12] and [13]. Consumer and catering markets for fish have also received attention, as fish has become more favoured as a food for a variety of different reasons including health, food scares, convenience etc. [14], [15], [16] and [17]. However notwithstanding the rise in the demand for fish and the increasingly complex interplay of wild captured and cultured products, the determination of prices of fish products within the value chains has been largely ignored. This paper seeks to address this paucity by exploring the price formation as an indicator of market oriented value within the value chain between fishers and the first hand buyer controlled for the exchange methods auction, contracts and minimum price regulation.

The analysis has shown price differences do exist between the regions analysed and that in most cases, prices of fish sold by auction are higher than the price of fish sold by contracts. Price differences are still present even when correcting for factors such as legal barriers, transport costs from different geographical locations, exchange fees and seasonal variations in supplies. The auction mechanism also provides an incentive to increase the number of specialized processing operations and their attendant marketing channels of by-catch and products. These combine and cumulatively contribute to the value-adding process based on whole fish. If a small part of the total catches is sold continuously through auctions, a reference-market price becomes established which influences contract prices. This tends to confirm the theoretical expectations of the exchange methods considered. Importantly, these conclusions might contradict current marketing theories which state that long-term market-oriented relationships between buyers and sellers improves the customer satisfaction and, by this, enhances long-term value adding [9]. This empirical investigation appears not to support this tenet. Fishing, not least because of its comparatively unique status of still-hunting wild species, varies as a result of natural environmental fluctuations and governmental regulations. The variations might differ between regions for the same species whereas demand may tend to greater stability over time. Clearly the main advantage of auctions is their ability to reflect short-term variations in supply and demand and nurture more market-oriented relationships through the value chain. Based on this empirical evidence from three countries over the 1990s there would seem to be an opportunity to add value at the ex-vessel level and strengthen regional socio-economic development by using auctions as a method of exchange rather than contracts. The critical factor is to sell the fish at auctions where many buyers participate and to emplace a distribution system, which enables rapid connections to target markets. This is especially valid for larger vessels, which have greater mobility, and so the capacity to land their catches where demand is highest. In the case of smaller vessels, they might land their catches at locations with grading and distribution systems feeding into the areas of highest demand. The analysis shows that the method of exchange used at the point of first hand sale does affect prices paid and that auctions constitute a more effective mechanism than contract sales to increase revenue from the natural resource base. In Norway those organising ex-vessel sales are aware of the effects of the different exchange methods and this is evident for example, in the development of auction markets for fresh and frozen fish in the Norges Råfisklag area during recent years. Constraints to the realisation of such benefits from auctions do exist however. The size and mobility of individual vessels is a common limiting factor because the area where small vessels are able to land their catch is generally more localised than that of the larger vessels. This reduces access to the number and range of potential fish buyers. However, by implementing the Icelandic model, which provides fishermen to land in small fishing ports for further transportation by trucks, it is possible to participate in a national Internet-based fish auction. Of course factors other than the method of exchange affect ex-vessel prices. The dual existence of two exchange methods in Iceland provided an interesting case study of the interaction of the ITQ system and industrial structure as discussed here and in Arnarson and Trondsen [28] and Matthiasson and Vallsson [25]. The interactions between fisheries management systems and prices are supported by Casey et al. [43] and Herrmann [44] who have shown that the introduction of ITQs influenced changes in ex-vessel prices in the case of halibut fishery in British Columbia. The presence of minimum legal prices also affects price differences between auction and contract sales and this is shown when comparing Icelandic prices where minimum legal prices are nearly absent compared to the Norwegian regions where much greater reliance is placed upon their presence. Auctions are also advantageous in enabling many smaller lots of more marginal species to be aggregated into bigger market oriented specialized value chains. When such supplies are congregated it becomes more viable for processors to develop more specific targeted markets. For example, this is so for plaice in North-Norway, which is landed in such small lots as a by-catch that it is often impossible for buyers to invest in species-specific added value processing and marketing activities. In contrast, the Icelandic infrastructure permits all such lots of plaice to be collected in the auction into profitable value adding chains [28]. The analysis shows that the exchange method used at first hand sale provides opportunities for adding-value to the increasingly scarce resource base. Indeed ex-vessel sales prices might be increased if fishers could sell their catch through auctions that attract several sellers and buyers. Fisheries management systems have economic objectives in addition to protecting fish stocks from over-exploration. The introduction of ITQs looks at fishing vessels as an open competition arena. This analysis has shown that the design of the exchange system is also important for the value of the fish landed and consequently the vessels ability to pay for the quota and the resource rent. The design of the exchange system is also important for the regional development at the coastal areas. The regions and harbours, which offer the most market oriented and efficient first hand sales exchange system, might gain in importance over regions without this advantage. This was in fact the case in the Faroe Islands and Iceland when fish auctions were established in harbours where the initiators wanted to attract more fish. Both harbours succeeded in attracting increased supplies at the same time as the local fishermen improved their income. Further studies should be carried out focusing on the regional effects of exchange systems and the development of marketing chains conceivably from the live wild fish. Given the spatial and temporal constraints that commonly exist around the more productive areas of the seas, Internet auctions combined with an efficient system for fish quality and logistics management would seem to hold significant opportunities for the future. More research into this prospect seems warranted and a more detailed understanding of the interaction of fisheries resource management and marketing is of particular contemporary relevance. This might be begun by further analysis of the effect of exchange in regions using both exchange methods and where there are no incentives for vessel owners to keep ex-vessel prices at a low level. With increasing concerns about the efficiency of resource utilisation a further candidate would be the influence of exchange methods on by-products and discards otherwise thrown back into the sea.