اعتبار و اثر سیگنالینگ برنامه های صندوق بین المللی پول

The IMF claims that the conditionality it attaches to its loans performs an important signalling function (IMF Survey, March 24, 1997). By negotiating a programme with the IMF a government signals its intention to implement an agreed programme of economic stabilisation and reform which is designed to enhance economic performance. Governments could, of course, commit themselves to similar policies outside the Fund. But, so the argument goes, in these circumstances pronouncements about economic reform would carry relatively little credibility with private international capital markets and aid donors, since there would be nothing much to stop governments reneging on their policy promises. There is a time consistency problem. What governments say may not be what they do.1 To overcome this problem they may choose to delegate elements of policy to independent policy-makers, giving up the control that it is feared they may misuse. Thus monetary policy may be delegated to an independent central bank free from political manipulation. Or macroeconomic policy may be constrained by a set of rules rather than being set purely by discretion. Policy-makers may opt to “tie their hands” in order to eliminate the chance of policy reversals and reduce their degree of freedom in order to reduce the degree of uncertainty about future policy. However for many developing countries and countries in transition (CITs) central bank independence may be premature and it may be difficult to define, let alone implement, appropriate policy rules relating to monetary goals and fiscal deficits. An alternative solution to the time consistency problem is therefore needed. One possibility may be to peg the exchange rate; many developing countries have used the exchange rate as a “nominal anchor.” But again how strong is the commitment to defend it? Does the policy carry credibility? In a crisis the peg is likely to be abandoned. For this reason some developing countries and CITs have been pushed towards adopting currency boards (Argentina and Bulgaria) or have even gone as far as full dollarisation (Ecuador). A second possibility is to agree a programme of economic reform with the IMF which is then monitored by the Fund to ensure that the government keeps on-track. Penalties for deviating from the programme are seen as giving it credibility. It is through this signalling role of conditionality that the Fund claims that its programmes exert a catalytic effect on other financial flows. Clearly if this is an effective way of overcoming time inconsistency and enhancing the credibility of policy reform, it would be a powerful argument for conditionality. But is it? This brief article suggests that neither theoretical analysis nor empirical evidence is consistent with the signalling role of IMF conditionality. From this, the article goes on to examine what changes in the Fund’s operations might allow a signalling role to be more effectively performed in the future.

The Fund claims a signalling role for conditionality which helps overcome the time consistency problem facing domestic policy-makers. This, it argues, is a new role for conditionality (Dhonte, 1997). Other observers have been critical of conditionality arguing that it does not work and should be abandoned in its current form, (IFIAC, 2000). The analysis in this paper identifies the factors that will influence the effectiveness of conditionality and IMF programmes as signalling devices. Against this background, empirical evidence challenges the notion that conditionality performs a powerful signalling function. Since there are differences between countries in terms of the factors determining credibility, cross-country differences in credibility are likely to exist but, in general, the credibility of IMF programmes is low. Signals about future economic performance may even be perverse in as much as IMF involvement reflects contemporary, and probably future, economic distress. Key to strengthening the signalling role of conditionality is improving the implementation of the programmes the Fund supports. In this endeavour it is important that the Fund should design appropriate incentives both qualitatively and quantitatively. IMF programmes need to be adequately resourced. As this happens the opportunity cost of losing IMF support would automatically rise. In the past, circumstances have frequently prevented the Fund from imposing adequate penalties for non-compliance. While the Fund cannot positively seek to make loans to its members it can, in principle, more frequently reject applications. This, in itself, would transmit a signal to countries about the need to prioritise economic stabilisation and reform. To do this, however, the Fund will need to be relieved from the political pressures that it may sometimes be under to side-step its economic judgements. An enhanced record for conditionality will clearly increase the credibility of IMF programmes and begin to help create the positive signal which the Fund seeks to transmit.