بدست آوردن اطلاعات در مقابل دستکاری اطلاعات در بازار های خرید چند دوره ای

In this study, we present a theoretical analysis of the strategic behavior of a bidder’s cartel in a multi-period procurement auction market. A buyer employs a Bayesian update mechanism to acquire information from past auction bidding data to formulate his estimation of the expected future price, and thus his procurement decision depends on both his expected future price and the current auction price. The cartel can both increase its profits and mask its presence by manipulating the information transmitted to the buyer. In fact, by employing some informational strategies, the cartel can misinform the buyer and skew the intertemporal procurement decision to its advantage. Finally, we find that imposing a bidding ceiling that exceeds the observed current auction price may be a feasible weapon that allows the buyer to reduce the adverse effects of bidder collusion.