اعتبار سنجی یک مدل از تأمین تجهیزات مشارکتی در صنعت ساخت و ساز

Project management in the construction industry involves coordination of many tasks and individuals, affected by complexity and uncertainty, which increases the need for efficient cooperation. Procurement is crucial since it sets the basis for cooperation between clients and contractors. This is true whether the project is local, regional or global in scope. Traditionally, procurement procedures are competitive, resulting in conflicts, adversarial relationships and less desirable project results. The purpose of this paper is to propose and empirically test an alternative procurement model based on cooperative procurement procedures that facilitates cooperation between clients and contractors in construction projects. The model is based on four multi-item constructs – incentive-based compensation, limited bidding options, partner selection and cooperation. Based on a sample of 87 client organisations, the model was empirically tested and exhibited strong support, including content, nomological, convergent and discriminant validity, as well as reliability. Our findings indicate that partner selection based on task related attributes mediates the relationship between two important pre-selection processes (incentive-based compensation and limited bid invitation) and preferred outcome of cooperation. The contribution of the paper is identifying valid and reliable measurement constructs and confirming a unique sequential order for achieving cooperation. Moreover, the findings are applicable for many types of construction projects because of the similarities in the construction industry worldwide.

Construction is an industry in which project management plays a crucial role. Project management is a core activity that involves the practice of setting up routines to coordinate and solve difficult tasks for a temporary team. The teams are often cross-functional, including members from many organisations with different interests and objectives. Managing construction projects is often very complex, involving many interactions and tasks requiring specific competence for each part of the project [1]. The actual construction process takes place in a project setting and shares many similarities across different countries throughout the world. To manage costs, increase quality and reduce risk, procurement has become a key part of the planning and coordinating process [2]. Due to increased uncertainty, complexity, time pressure and customization in construction projects, high levels of coordination and cooperation among project participants are required [3] and [4]. Suppliers, including for example plumbers, electricians, carpenters, painters and machine drivers, must work together to provide complex and customized solutions within a short period of time. These suppliers meet many times during the actual construction process to solve and adapt to emerging difficulties that cannot be planned for and covered in a contract ex ante due to, for example, uncertain ground conditions or changing client demands. The task of coordinating and managing the many suppliers and their activities is often performed by the main contractor (or Construction Management Company). The client then has only a single point of contact to ensure that promises and contractual requirements are being met. Traditionally, client–contractor relationships have been characterized as adversarial and maintaining arms-length distance, as a result of competitive procurement procedures. Recently, clients and main contractors are increasingly coordinating their activities, and often develop close cooperative relationships (typically referred to as partnering) with each other and share many experiences from project to project [5]. Such partnering relationships improve coordination and flexibility, which is often beneficial in projects characterized by complexity and uncertainty [6] and [7]. Partnering has received much positive attention in recent research, but some researchers claim that full fledged partnering is not always suitable [8] and [9]. In fact a suitable balance between cooperation and competition often is most appropriate [10]. Notwithstanding the potential shortcomings of partnering most authors agree that increased cooperation is desirable in construction projects characterized by high complexity, customization, time pressures, and uncertainty [6], [11] and [12]. Previous research confirms that cooperative relationships are not easily established [9] and [13]. In fact, most clients realize the importance of cooperative relationships but lack the understanding of how to establish them [10], [14] and [15]. The movement toward more cooperative relationships is hindered by the traditional type of procurement that encourages competition rather than cooperation [16]. Hence, it would be useful to identify an alternative type of procurement and increase the understanding of how clients can establish cooperative relationships with contractors through cooperative procurement procedures. The purpose of this paper is therefore to propose and empirically test an alternative procurement model, based on cooperative procurement procedures, which facilitates cooperation between clients and contractors in construction projects. Since the construction industry shares many similarities worldwide, the findings should have widespread applicability.

Traditionally, construction clients rely on competitive procurement procedures involving invitation of numerous bidders that prepare lump sum contract proposals based on detailed design documents prepared ex ante by the client and their consultants. In bid evaluation the lowest lump sum price is the most important criterion. In recent years this type of procurement has received increasing criticism for causing disputes and adversarial relationships, which in turn lead to time and cost overruns, diminished quality and poor customer satisfaction. Increased cooperation is suggested as one potential solution to reduce these problems. This paper proposed and empirically tested an alternative procurement model based on cooperative procurement procedures, which facilitates cooperation between clients and contractors in construction projects. We also believe the proposed theoretical model is more consistent with current business conditions in which procurement includes numerous subjective criteria that emphasize partner characteristics rather than price. Our research proposed a theoretical model to test three hypothesized relationships. The model was validated and results confirm that partner selection based on task related attributes mediates pre-selection processes (incentive-based compensation and limited bid invitation) and directly affects cooperation. As theories that include key mediating constructs suggest, these effects can be reinforced by an intervening factor [45] and [46]. By testing and confirming this relationship, this paper contributes significantly to theory on project management. Our findings indicate that cooperative procurement procedures, including invitation of a limited number of trustworthy and competent bidders, incentive-based compensation, and careful partner selection based on task related attributes, enhances cooperation between clients and contractors. Hence, construction clients should be encouraged to include incentive-based compensation and limited bid invitation coupled with careful partner selection techniques as a means for increasing effectiveness and enhancing cooperation during concurrent engineering and construction processes. Cooperative procurement procedures are especially important in the management of complex and uncertain construction projects with time pressures for completion. The implication of this study is that risk and uncertainty could be reduced by carefully selecting partners that match requirements of specific tasks as a specific part of the project. This implication arises from the conclusion that careful partner selection delivers more predictable outcomes [24]. It is important to recognize that the three individual procurement procedures work jointly to enhance cooperation. Hence, implementing only one part (e.g. incentive-based compensation) in an otherwise competitive procurement model will not result in increased cooperation. All parts of the model should be implemented together.