سیاست های ضد قیمت شکنی (Dumping) در اتحادیه اروپا و توزیع تجارتی

Anti-dumping actions are by nature discriminatory. Imports from targeted countries are discriminated against relative to domestic producers but also relative to imports from non-named countries in the rest of the world. This paper analyses the impact of anti-dumping actions in the EU, distinguishing between the impact upon named countries, non-named countries in the rest of the world and non-named countries in the EU. The results suggest that anti-dumping policies cause trade diversion and that this diversion is primarily to non-EU suppliers.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of EU anti-dumping measures. Anti-dumping actions are by nature discriminatory. Imports from targeted countries are discriminated against relative to domestic producers in the EU, and also relative to non-named extra-EU countries.1 It is therefore not necessarily the case that firms initiating anti-dumping procedures will be beneficiaries of restrictions on imports from the named countries. Trade can be diverted to other suppliers in the EU and to non-named suppliers in the rest of the world. In this case, the effect of the removal of the duties or the ending of price undertakings will be felt beyond the complainant firms. The focus of this paper is to assess the extent of trade diversion associated with EU anti-dumping actions. Previous empirical studies suggest that trade diversion has been important in the EU in the 1980s (Messerlin, 1989) and in the US (Prusa, 1997). The first section of the paper provides a simple graphical analysis of the economic impact of EU anti-dumping actions on trade within the EU, imports from named countries and imports from other countries in the rest of the world. The paper then proceeds to an econometric analysis of trade diversion in EU anti-dumping policies. A final section provides conclusions.

An important feature of the application of anti-dumping measures in the EU appears to be the diversion of trade away from countries subject to measures to other countries exporting to the EU market. The trade diversion appears to be significant only for imports from non-EU countries. Imports from other EU members are not greatly affected. This conclusion, that anti-dumping actions in the EU cause trade diversion, is consistent with similar studies of the US and studies of the EU using data for a previous period. Lack of data prevents an analysis of the impact of anti-dumping measures on the firms that petition for the action. However, developments in intra-EU trade may provide a proxy for the impact upon domestic suppliers. If so, then it would appear that these firms are unlikely to benefit from an increased volume of sales or an increase in market share following the levying of anti-dumping measures against particular external suppliers of the EU market. Anti-dumping investigations may curtail the trend decline in market share of domestic firms and appear to affect the price of imports from non-named countries in the rest of the world. Here, we have only been able to look at the (cif) price of imports as they enter the port. It would also be interesting to look at developments in the final selling price of products subject to anti-dumping measures.