تدابیر سودآوری جایگزین و ساختار کانال بازاریابی : تصمیم حق رای (فرانشیز)
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|2915||2000||8 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Business Research, Volume 50, Issue 2, November 2000, Pages 217–224
Analysis of marketing channel structure in general, and the decision to franchise in particular, has assumed that the decision maker is seeking to maximize the long-term economic value of the firm. In this article, we consider an alternative accounting-based objective function. We explore some circumstances that might lead to the use of an accounting-based objective function, including the incentive structure faced by non-owner managers, the life cycle of the firm including an impending initial public offering, and data availability considerations. A simple model of franchisor performance is developed and several scenarios of franchise system expansion examined. Decisions to open franchised or company-owned outlets are compared using the competing objective functions.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968) posited that franchisors franchise begrudgingly, and only do so in order to attract capital for the initial expansion of their operation. Franchisees are hard to control, so when franchisors no longer face human and financial capital constraints, they will buy back the franchises and operate all but the marginal outlets as company stores. At the core of Oxenfeldt and Kelly's idea was the accepted belief that capital could be more efficiently acquired by selling franchised outlets than by selling shares in a company chain. This thesis set in motion a series of theoretical and empirical papers that sought to prove or disprove their basic contention [see Dant, Paswan, and Kaufmann (1996) for a meta-analysis of the relevant research]. Rubin (1978) attacked their basic assumption and argued that if capital markets are efficient, then the greater diversification offered to investors in a chain of stores (and the commensurate reduction in risk) would make the sale of shares less costly than capital provided by franchisees (because franchisees bear the undiversified risk of owning only one store). Consequently, Rubin argued, the rationale for franchising must lie elsewhere: in the incentives created by the franchisees' claims to profits and the bonding effect of the franchise fee. Lafontaine (1992) responded that if Rubin's incentive arguments were correct, then investors would be aware of the motivation and monitoring problems faced by a company using employee store managers. This would cause investors to demand higher returns on their share holdings, which could make franchisee-provided capital relatively more efficient after all. Thus, the need to finance expansion remains a possible rationale for franchising (Kaufmann and Dant, 1996). The question of whether franchising reflects a preferred method of financing expansion or the solution to agency problems takes on a different meaning if we change the basic assumptions about the objective function of the franchisor. As shown above, if a franchisor is seeking to maximize AV, it will benefit more from capital invested in company units than from capital invested in supporting franchising, even though the capital invested in company units may be less efficient according to EV measures than capital invested in franchising. Company outlets deliver more NI than franchise royalties deliver, and AV measures are driven by NI. Therefore, all else being equal, a franchisor maximizing AV will favor company outlets and will franchise only if it must (i.e., only if it has no access to capital other than from franchisees). To this point, we have focused on the efficiency of capital. What is the impact of considering agency issues? Franchisees are assumed to be less likely to shirk and thus deliver greater store level returns than employee managers. An AV maximizing retailer will franchise an outlet if, and only if, store managers shirk so severely that the operating profits from a company outlet are less than the net royalties (i.e., royalties minus the operating expenses of running the franchise system) the franchisor would receive from the outlet in the hands of a franchisee. Because royalties are typically a relatively small percentage of sales, this rarely occurs. Therefore, for AV-maximizing retailers, franchising is more likely to reflect the lack of an alternative source of capital than an attempt to solve agency problems. On the other hand, for EV maximizing retailers, the cost of the capital tied up in company-owned outlets is charged against NI, and the franchising becomes more attractive even when sufficient capital is available to open company-owned units. Our analysis has significant implications with respect to Oxenfeldt and Kelly's thesis. Retailers who manage their business so as to maximize AV instead of EV will be more likely to favor owning company units, and vice versa. Consequently, if a franchisor shifts from EV to AV objectives (for example, in anticipation of an IPO), one would expect to see the franchisor move toward the greater proportion of company-owned outlets predicted by Oxenfeldt and Kelly, but for an entirely different reason than the one they proposed. On the other hand, if a franchisor shifts from AV to EV measures, it is likely to franchise a greater proportion of its outlets. This shift is contrary to Oxenfeldt and Kelly's hypothesized life-cycle tendency toward company-owned outlets, and may explain some of the contradictory empirical results in this area (Dant, Paswan, and Kaufmann, 1996). We have discussed the reasons a firm may shift from EV to AV measures. Shifts in the other direction also are occurring. EV measures are being marketed aggressively by consulting firms, including Stern Stewart & Co., HOLT Value Associates, and the Boston Consulting Group. At the same time, large U.S. companies are developing their own EV measures in-house (Myers, 1996). A number of public companies have shifted from AV to EV measures. For example, lamenting the amount of capital required to open company-owned restaurants, the chairman of Pepsico told analysts that by leveraging its funds to open more franchised outlets, Pepsico subsidiary Pizza Hut could double its “free” cash generation (Rudnitsky, 1995). A shift to a more EV-focused strategy may be one explanation for Pepsico's abrupt reversal from a clear strategy of reacquiring franchises in the late 1980s to a program of selling company-owned outlets to franchisees (PRNewswire, Sept. 26, 1996). It is also consistent with the recent decision to spin off the entire restaurant group. Our model and analysis have a narrow focus. We have considered the influence of the choice of EV versus AV financial measures on firm structure in only one context: the marketing channel decision to franchise. Most of our consideration of the decision to franchise falls within one framework: a framework of economic rationality. Our analysis may be limited to franchisors who are sophisticated enough to understand and attend to the differences between EV and AV approaches. Nevertheless, because of the demonstrated impact of a shift in orientation from EV to AV measures or vice versa and because of the evidence that these shifts do occur, we believe it is important for researchers to identify firm-specific objectives and to incorporate them in the analysis of the decision to use franchised or direct channels.Harrington Fabozzi Folger Russell 1990, Murphy 1962, PRNewswire 1996 and Stewart Bennett 1991