گردش مالی و شکست فرانشیز : پژوهش جدید و دیدگاه ها
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|2923||2003||16 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Business Venturing, Volume 18, Issue 3, May 2003, Pages 403–418
Entrepreneurship literature has long noted likely significant new venture failure rates. This paper's new franchise failure concept reconciles many prior, seemingly inconsistent study results based largely on franchisor's surveys. Data include more than 800 franchise systems and 250,000 franchise outlets over four consecutive years and are based on state-required Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC) registration data. Overall franchisee turnover rates are significant and appear to have increased. The result is a 1997 median franchisee turnover with a transfer rate of 10.49% (8.86% in 1994). Franchisee failure and turnover are important areas that merit further study and analysis.
Entrepreneurship literature has long noted significant new venture failure rates. Furthermore, few franchise topics have generated more interest over the years than franchise failure rates. Past franchisee failure literature, based largely on franchisor surveys, used very divergent concepts and indicated widely ranging failure estimates. On the low end, many studies used the old Department of Commerce numbers in the 4–5% range. On the higher end, some estimates were in the 25–35% range (Hartnett, 1992). This paper presents both a broader concept of franchisee failure and new longitudinal data. The new concept is significant because it reconciles many of the prior, seemingly inconsistent study results. These new data are significant because of their scope (more than 800 franchise systems and 250,000 franchise outlets), the duration (four consecutive years), and the validity of being provided under oath (required by state registration statutes). The new concept and data combination facilitates new explorations of research questions surrounding franchisee failure. The facet of failure studied was “turnover,” the term specified in the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC) disclosure documents. Whether viewed as means or medians, and with or without transfers, overall franchisee turnover rates appear to have increased noticeably over the 4-year study period. The result is a 1997 median turnover with transfer rate of 10.49% (8.86% in 1994). A broader stakeholder view of franchisee failure that goes beyond the franchisor and franchisee reveals many additional actual and/or opportunity costs/losses. Suppliers, financial institutions, customers, investors, and others all suffer as the circle of real and/or opportunity cost/loss widens because of franchisee turnover. Franchisee turnover itself, however, is only one step on the failure continuum. If recognized and managed at earlier steps on the continuum, systematic risk mitigation strategies might be developed, losses minimized, and turnover possibly avoided. Hence, these strategies may avoid real and/or opportunity costs if franchisor–franchisee relationships, business issues, and failure risk are managed appropriately. This paper's increased UFOC data validity and franchisee turnover insights represent new and important information for existing and prospective franchisee ventures. Franchisee failure and turnover are important areas that merit further study and analysis.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Past franchisee failure literature has included numerous divergent accounts and statistical franchisee failure estimates. Prior studies, based largely on franchisor surveys, contain potential definitional and data problems. In addition, the failure concept utilized has often placed franchisees into a relatively simplistic position of being either “successes” or “failures”. This paper uses a broader franchisee failure concept and provides new actual longitudinal franchisee failure data. Combined, they present a better understanding of evolving franchisor and franchisee business success/failure dimensions and realities. The emergence of more reliable franchisee turnover UFOC data provides valuable new franchisee failure turnover information and perspectives. With 4 years of data for over 800 franchisors and over 250,000 franchisee units, many research questions can be examined more extensively. Franchisee overall turnover rates appear to have increased over the 4-year period when examining total franchisee turnover with transfer or turnover-only data. By 1997, the median turnover rate was 10.49% with transfers and 5.54% without transfers. Franchisee turnover was also analyzed relative to variables of industry, system size, growth rates, and initial investment. While these data may provide preliminary insights, data for these variables are not conclusive, show a variety of patterns, or provide mixed indicators. More sophisticated subcategory data analysis was constrained by the lack of individual franchisor and franchisee company data. Further research is needed to resolve some ambiguities in present subcategory data. Broadening the franchisee failure perspective in two regards expands the potential real or opportunity cost/loss. First, a stakeholder perspective mandates inclusion of parties beyond the franchisor and franchisee. Suppliers, financial institutions, customers, investors, and others may have real costs/losses and/or opportunity costs due to franchisee turnover. Second, placing franchise failure on a continuum Holmberg and Morgan, 1996 and Holmberg and Morgan, 2000 implies that franchisors, franchisees, and other stakeholders could see real costs/losses and/or opportunity costs at stages prior to and after the turnover phase. There are costs if franchisor–franchisee relationships and business issues are not managed appropriately. These real or opportunity costs could be minimized by systematic franchisee failure risk mitigation strategies deployed early and throughout the phases described in the Holmberg–Morgan franchise failure continuum model phases. This paper's increased UFOC data validity and franchisee turnover insights represent new, important information for existing and potential franchisee ventures. Franchisee turnover and franchisee failure are critical areas that merit further study and analysis.