مدل اعتماد و پذیرش در روابط فرانشیز (فرانچایز)
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|2952||2011||20 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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|شرح||تعرفه ترجمه||زمان تحویل||جمع هزینه|
|ترجمه تخصصی - سرعت عادی||هر کلمه 90 تومان||18 روز بعد از پرداخت||1,273,500 تومان|
|ترجمه تخصصی - سرعت فوری||هر کلمه 180 تومان||9 روز بعد از پرداخت||2,547,000 تومان|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Business Venturing, Volume 26, Issue 3, May 2011, Pages 321–340
Despite the danger of franchisee non-compliance as a severe impediment to overall franchise operation and performance, there is currently minimal understanding of the key factors that lead to these behaviors. Using a foundation of relational exchange theory, we construct and test a model that demonstrates how two distinct forms of trust, based upon perceptions of franchisor integrity and franchisor competence, are critical to explaining the roles that relational conflict and satisfaction play in influencing franchisee compliance. Implications of these findings are then demonstrated to have compelling relevance to the effective management of franchise systems.
Business format franchise organizations recognize that the success of their system is directly influenced by their ability to design and enforce rigid operational standards across their network of retail units. Yet franchise networks can be characterized as a community of entrepreneurs, each of which has aspirations toward autonomy and innovativeness. As a consequence, a significant challenge for franchisors concerns their ability to enhance franchisee compliance with these standards without thwarting franchisee ambition. While dysfunctional relationship conflict has long been understood to adversely affect franchisee compliance (Grünhagen and Dorsch, 2003), the mechanisms by which this occurs are not well understood. Although trust has been advanced as playing a critical role in facilitating relational exchange and reducing the harm that conflict exerts on compliance, limited attention has been given to the specific role that trust and its various dimensions play in franchisee compliance. Using a theoretical foundation of relational exchange to explain the critical role that trust plays in enhancing franchisee compliance, the authors advance a series of multidimensional models which clarify the interrelated roles of satisfaction, conflict, and trust as they relate to levels of compliance. These models are then assessed empirically by comprehensively surveying 135 franchise entrepreneurs belonging to a single automobile service franchise system. Confirmatory factor analysis is used for validation of our measures, and structural equation modeling is used to test our hypotheses. The results of our analyses clearly distinguish between trust in franchisor integrity and trust in franchisor competence, and demonstrate that each is differentially impacted by relationship conflict. We further demonstrate that these two forms of trust are robust predictors of franchisee compliance to organizational norms. We contend that this multidimensional conceptualization of trust within conditions of relational exchange offers significant advantages to franchisors in their efforts to improve franchisee compliance with organizational policies. Further, by positioning our results within the context of relational exchange theory, we argue that contractual parameters of a franchise relationship, while necessary, are generally insufficient for aligning the interests of franchisors and franchisees such that compliance is optimized. To augment contractual policies, norms of reciprocity can be invoked by introducing relational forms of governance (Blau, 1964). In franchise environments characterized by high levels of perceived integrity–and to a lesser extent, competence–and where entrepreneurial aspirations for autonomy are supported, these norms of reciprocity can then be expected to lead to cooperative behaviors and a higher level of compliance with relational expectations.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
Our study represents advances in entrepreneurial knowledge. Specifically, it sheds light on the particular causes of hazards to entrepreneurial cooperation. These hazards to entrepreneurial cooperation need to be thoroughly understood, since they diminish the strategic leverage by which these organizational arrangements can overcome impediments to exploiting market opportunities. Our research demonstrates conceptually (through relational exchange theory) and empirically (through our model and measures), why and how cooperative relationships based on trust (or more broadly, social capital) are indispensable for successful entrepreneurship—a key research area identified by Venkataraman (1997). Specifically, we examine why and how franchisors can discover and exploit opportunities for cultivating and sustaining both integrity trust and competence trust to ensure franchisee compliance—a critical driver of cooperative relations associated with successful franchises. Importantly, we have shown how trust is comprised of the distinct dimensions of both integrity and competence that differentially impact on conflict and compliance. This serendipitous finding was overlooked in previous research (cf. Dickey et al., 2007). Part of the requisite process for building trust is in orchestrating appropriate perceptions of equity and fairness based on how decisions are made, and how each party shares risk within the franchise. This task reflects a need to balance autonomy from the franchisee perspective with control from the franchisor vantage. Ideally, franchisors should be proactive in managing trust to ensure smooth running of the franchise. By entrusting in a franchisor, the franchisee accepts the perceived hazard of committing to their franchisors' requests, effectively shifting much of the actual risk from the franchisor to their franchisee. Our model suggests that without mutual trust, much franchisor time will be directed into managing dissatisfied franchisees, and in reconciling dysfunctional conflict that can distract from building the strategic side of the business. When conflict is dysfunctional, it is unlikely the franchisees will commit fully and cooperatively to the spirit and intentions of the franchise contract, squandering valuable social capital for both franchisor and franchisees. In short, the ability to overcome opportunism, reflected in discouraging non-compliance, is a major challenge for successful entrepreneurs within franchise systems. Whereas many studies have examined various aspects of franchising from the perspective of franchisors, minimal research has been conducted into these relationships from the franchisee perspective (Hing, 1995 and Grünhagen Mittelstaedt, 2000). In an effort to address this shortcoming, this paper explored the pivotal importance of franchisee trust within franchise relationships. We specifically examined franchisors' needs to cultivate and sustain sufficient levels of trust with their franchisees in order to avoid franchisee non-compliance with system policies and norms — a common problem which leads to diminished performance on the part of both individual franchisees, and across the overall franchise system. Our study revealed that franchisee's trust in the integrity of the franchisor is significantly damaged by relational conflict, and this form of trust is a necessary prerequisite for franchisee compliance with organizational norms. Conversely, franchisee's trust in the competence of the franchisor is not significantly influenced by relational conflict, and this form of trust has a less substantial influence on compliance. Overall, we suggest that franchisors, which are generally eager to improve conformity with operational guidelines, would greatly benefit from a richer understanding of the role that multiple forms of trust play as preconditions to franchisee compliance, and should endeavor to develop relational forms of governance in order to augment contractual norms and encourage reciprocal behaviors.