عمده فروشی متمرکز و رقابت چند وجهی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|3053||2010||11 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Telecommunications Policy, Volume 34, Issues 1–2, February–March 2010, Pages 54–64
This paper explores the effects of network unbundling in telecommunications. It includes discussions of the basic economics of unbundling; the competitive effects of unbundling on voice services in the US and broadband in the US and the European Union; and unbundling policy in a world of convergence. Mandatory unbundling can delay facilities-based entry and reduce network investment, particularly if unbundled input prices are set too low. Excessive prices for essential network elements could hamper competitive entry. Some argue that mandatory unbundling has stimulated competition; however, the results suggest that when relevant demand and supply determinants are included in the analysis, the association between mandatory unbundling and increased broadband penetration is not statistically significant. Assessing the costs and benefits of unbundling is more difficult because of convergence and intermodal competition among the video, wireless and telephone providers. Thus, the dynamic nature of the sector and the costs of implementing mandatory unbundling imply that policy makers should carefully examine the costs and benefits of regulatory intervention.
This paper explores whether network unbundling leads to increased competition in the communications industry by assessing US experience with wireline voice, EU and US experience with broadband, and experience with wireless resale in different countries. It includes a summary of the economic arguments for and against mandatory network unbundling; an evaluation of the effects of mandatory unbundling efforts; and perspectives on how the concepts and the experience with network unbundling apply in a world of convergence and portfolio competition. The primary findings are: mandatory unbundling carries with it significant risks—that is, if prices for unbundled network elements (UNEs) are set too high, UNEs will not be used by entrants; if they are set too low, then investment incentives are distorted for both the facilities provider and the entrant. Wholesale unbundling in some instances may have contributed to increased competition. However, the analysis suggests that the apparent association between unbundling and increased broadband penetration is not statistically significant when relevant economic, demographic, and supply determinants are included in the analysis. As communications networks converge and the demand for wireline services decreases globally, intermodal competition is more prevalent and the benefits of unbundling are more difficult to assess, and unbundling arguably becomes a regulatory tool of the past. Given the dynamic nature of the communications industry, the costs and the risks of implementing mandatory unbundling, and the international differences in geographic, demographic, and market conditions, policy makers should use a case-by-case approach that carefully examines the contours of the relevant market(s) at issue as well as the costs and benefits of any regulatory intervention.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
A number of factors make it difficult to assess the need for unbundling in today's telecommunications sector. In particular, network convergence has blurred the boundaries between previously distinct platforms and given rise to vigorous intermodal competition. Formerly distinct industry sectors are converging. Cable companies offer voice and broadband as well as video; and, the LECs have transformed their platforms to provide broadband and video as well as voice services and traditional private line data services. Wireless mobile providers compete for voice services (from fixed locations as well as for mobile calls), data and video services instead of just for mobile voice. These formerly separate and distinct sectors now compete for the same service bundles—voice, data, and video; LECs, in particular, face the prospect of rapid entry and exit from their traditional markets (contestability) because of the presence of the other platforms; and, market definitions have blurred. For example, in the US cable broadband services and bundles of broadband voice and video compete with LEC broadband and bundled services. In this context, determining whether the theoretical benefits of network unbundling – notably the promise of greater competition in retail markets – outweigh the costs – notably regulatory costs, distorted investment incentives, and reduced facilities-based competition – has become more difficult. The economic evidence from mandatory wholesale unbundling is not strong enough to justify its imposition without a showing that market forces have failed. The above analyses show that facilities-based competition from mobile wireless and cable voice providers, rather than UNE-based entry, is the predominant source of competition faced by US ILECs; and supply and demand factors other than broadband unbundling policies explain the relative broadband penetration rates of OECD countries. Thus (especially when intermodal competition is present) policy makers must conduct a careful cost–benefit analysis before they require mandatory unbundling. The analysis must be conducted on a case-by-case basis because different geographic areas may have different economic and competitive characteristics. International comparisons that carefully account for regional economic and demographic differences may allow regulators to understand what worked, where, and why. As a general matter, regulation should be used as a last resort only after: the relevant economic market is defined; competition and potential competition in the relevant market(s) are carefully examined; and it is clear that market forces are likely to fail to lead to viable outcomes. Moreover, in view of the costs and imperfections of regulation – for example, the direct costs, pricing distortions – unregulated markets do not have to work perfectly to beat regulated alternatives, which may also be highly imperfect.