طراحی و پیاده سازی حسابداری کتاب باز در زوج خریدار و فروشنده: چارچوبی برای انتخاب تامین کننده و انگیزه

Though Open Book Accounting (OBA) is a well-known practice in supply chain management, the lack of guidelines to support managers to implement it effectively has been highlighted in the literature. This paper discusses a methodology to support the selection of suppliers with whom to successfully cooperate in OBA projects and the identification, for each buyer–supplier dyad, of appropriate incentives to enable cost data disclosure. The methodology has been developed using empirical findings from an action research the authors have conducted in close collaboration with an Italian manufacturer of modular kitchens and 19 of its suppliers. It emerges that the sourcing strategy and the nature of cost data disclosed should drive the buyer's decisions on how to use disclosed account data and how to select the most appropriate set of incentives to encourage suppliers' participation. In particular, the sourcing strategy mainly affects the supplier's reaction to incentives and the uses of cost data shared, while the nature of open books agreements primarily influences the buyer's attitude to commit resources to specific suppliers and, therefore, to activate the more costly incentives. These findings have interesting implications for the identification of the suppliers with whom to collaborate in open books programs, for the selection of incentives to mitigate suppliers' natural reluctance to disclose cost data, and for restrictions in the use of disclosed data to ensure that they are not abused within and outside the relation.

The concept of Open Book Accounting (OBA) concerns the disclosure of cost and other data generated by the accounting systems among supply chain members. In practice, data disclosure is often unidirectional, from supplier to buyer (Agndal and Nilsson, 2010). For the buyer the aim is to acquire knowledge about upstream processes and to conduct joint activities with supply chain partners to reduce costs. In fact, opening the books allows the buyer to support the supplier in identifying critical areas where efficiency improvements can be implemented (Agndal and Nilsson, 2008). Although there is a growing interest in the cost information sharing field (Kajüter and Kulmala, 2005 and Agndal and Nilsson, 2008), recent studies point to the lack of empirical evidence regarding the implementation of OBA practices (Agndal and Nilsson, 2010) and the avoidance of pitfalls that could negatively affect managerial efforts (Chin-Chun et al., 2008 and Piontkowski and Hoffjan, 2008). In particular, authors concur that the careful identification of suppliers with whom to collaborate in open books programs plays a key role in successful OBA implementation (Agndal and Nilsson, 2009). Selecting the wrong counterpart can jeopardize the achievement of the desired cost improvements. A further key task for the buying company is to enable cost data disclosure by creating the conditions under which the selected suppliers agree to share the specific cost information the buyer intends to acquire (Baiman and Rajan, 2002 and Madlberger, 2008). Again, selecting the wrong set of incentives can expose OBA implementation to the risk of failure. The literature still lacks a comprehensive implementation model that simultaneously supports supplier selection and the identification, for each buyer–supplier dyad, of the conditions that mitigate a supplier's natural reluctance to disclose cost data. This paper aims to fill this gap through an action research the authors conducted to analyze the relationships between an Italian manufacturer of modular kitchens and 19 of its suppliers. The buying company is among the five largest kitchen manufacturers in Europe (268 million € turnover in 2010; 1650 employees in 8 production plants located in Italy, France and Germany), purchasing the major part of its components from external suppliers and then assembling the final product. The value of OBA as an approach to identifying the potential in reducing costs is particularly relevant in the modular kitchen context because the total purchase cost represents a large proportion of the final cost of a kitchen. This study contributes to existing research in the OBA field by outlining how the sourcing strategy adopted by the buying firm (single-sourcing vs. multi-sourcing) interacts with the nature of cost data disclosure (detailed and frequent vs. general and occasional), the uses of disclosed data and the conditions under which data are disclosed. From a managerial point of view, the research findings have interesting implications for the identification of the suppliers with whom to collaborate in open books programs, for the selection of incentives to mitigate suppliers' natural reluctance to disclose cost data, and for restrictions in the use of disclosed data to ensure that they are not abused within and outside the relation. The paper is organized as follows: the next section focuses on the literature review, from which it emerges that there is a lack of guidelines as to how to implement OBA. The third section describes the action research process which led to the development of the proposed OBA implementation model. The following sections describe the proposed model and discuss the results. In the conclusions, we present the academic and managerial implications together with some indications for future research.

The main contributions of this study emerged from our attempt to apply Agndal and Nilsson's (2010) model to a real company engaged in the implementation of OBA programs with some selected suppliers. We confirm that the sourcing strategy interacts with the three key dimensions of OBA practices, namely the nature, uses and conditions under which data are disclosed. As compared with previous research, we provide a more in-depth picture of how this interaction takes place. From Table 3 it emerges that the sourcing strategy and the nature of cost data disclosed should drive the buyer's decisions on how to use disclosed account data and how to select the most appropriate set of incentives to encourage suppliers' participation. In particular, the sourcing strategy mainly affects the supplier's reaction to incentives and the uses of cost data shared, while the nature of open books agreements primarily influences the buyer's attitude to commit resources to specific suppliers and, therefore, to activate the more costly incentives. These findings have interesting implications for the selection of incentives and for restrictions in the use of cost disclosed data. Incentive selection. A key aspect of incentive selection concerns the mitigation of suppliers' natural reluctance to disclose cost data. Our findings confirm that in the multi-sourcing context incentives center on instant and tangible rewards, while in single-sourcing context benefits for suppliers also include trust-building and improvements in long term competitiveness ( Cooper and Yoshikawa, 1994, Dekker, 2003 and Kulmala, 2004). As in Agndal and Nilsson (2010), this result can be read through the lens of the transaction cost theory. In the relational context characterizing single-sourcing, openly sharing cost data may be intended to support ongoing and future collaborative initiatives (e.g. joint product development, continuous improvements/kaizen and value engineering); hence suppliers tend to recognize as incentives the improvements achieved through data disclosure. However, in the more transactional context typical of multi-sourcing, disclosing data to build trust is arguably less relevant. Incentives should, therefore, represent compensation for participation in open books arrangements. This result is in line also with the agency theory perspective, as argued by Manatsa and McLaren (2008) who underline that less tangible, nonmonetary incentives (e.g. technical support and problem solving teams) are more preferable in long-term and closer relationships, whereas they are less likely to be incorporated into short-term managerial decision making because risk-adverse agents in transactional relationships are more likely to prefer tangible incentives (e.g. greater volumes and longer contracts). In addition, our study shed light on a further key aspect of incentive selection decisions, namely the reward of the buyer's supplier-specific investment on incentive action. This point has been overlooked by previous research. We found that the buying company will agree to commit resources and investment to expensive incentives for specific suppliers (e.g. marketing, technical and negotiation support) only when data disclosure involves exchanges of detailed cost data on a continuous basis. The transaction cost theory confirms our findings as it suggests that supplier-specific idiosyncratic investments and frequent exchanges are often associated with relational sourcing and, in extreme cases, to hierarchical arrangements (Williamson, 1975). Restrictions. In open book agreements suppliers usually impose restrictions concerning the uses of disclosed data to ensure they are not abused within and outside the relation ( Kulmala, 2004 and Vosselman and van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009). However, we found somewhat different dynamics as compared to previous research. Agndal and Nilsson (2010) cross-analyzed three case studies and reported that the more relational the purchasing strategy, the more restrictive the use of disclosed data. Instead, we found that it is in the multi-sourcing transactional context that suppliers tend to express more restrictions and require formal policy documents regarding the use of disclosed data (see Case B and D). It should be noted that suppliers were not accustomed to a preferential relationship with the buying company, hence, as Langfield-Smith (2008) argues, the lack of past experiences of loyal and non-opportunistic cooperation made it more difficult to allay fears concerning the abuse of confidential data (e.g. cost data, product and process embedded knowledge). Instead, in the single-sourcing context, the lack of alternative suppliers facilitated cost data disclosure. It was in the case of company C that the single-supplier perceived the buyer's request for price discount as an abuse that caused the failure of the open books project. This confirms that the use/abuse of data can heavily affect cost disclosure success because collaboration is primarily based on trust ( Kulmala, 2004 and Kajüter and Kulmala, 2005). Fig. 3 summarizes the main literature contributions to this study. Full-size image (46 K) Fig. 3. Main literature contributions. Figure options It is interesting to note that the supplier selection and motivation model proposed in this study can be interpreted using the agency theory, which focuses on incentives and contract types as a means to reduce the negative impact of goal divergence among the parties in the supply chain (Halldórsson and Skjøtt-Larsen, 2006). In our study, the buying company can be viewed as the principal engaging in an agency relationship when attempting to gain accurate cost data from a supplier, who may be viewed as its agent. Eisenhardt (1989) underlines that the main issues stressed by agency theory concern the existence of asymmetric information between the parties and the principal's and the agent's different attitudes towards risk. Seen from the principal's point of view, Bergen et al. (1992) maintain that OBA is a measure that helps to reduce the risk of asymmetrical information. This gives the customer control over the supplier's behavior since it removes the uncertainty as to whether the components are overpriced. The principal faces “pre-contractual” and “post-contractual” issues when entering a relationship with an agent. “Pre-contractual” problems arise before the principal decides to offer an agent a contract. In this situation, the principal needs to understand whether a particular agent has the characteristics the principal is seeking. The supplier selection phase included in the OBA implementation model proposed in this paper addresses “pre-contractual” problems as it supports the buying company in the choice of the counterparts to involve in OBA programs. “Post-contractual” problems emerge after the principal and agent engage in a relationship. The major issues here are how the principal should evaluate and reward the agent's performance to align the agent with the principal's goals. The part of the OBA implementation model regarding decisions on incentives and restrictions supports the principal in the identification of the actions that will guarantee the agent a sufficient payoff to overcome its natural reluctance to disclose cost data.