تخصیص ظرفیت در رقابت های پایین دست و چانه زنی

Under the dual channel, as market competition intensifies, the high-cost firm’s shared capacity always decreases; however, the low-cost firm’s shared capacity decreases and increases sequentially if the manufacturer’s bargaining power is sufficiently small, and increases if her bargaining power is sufficiently large. The reason is that the low-cost firm’s competitive advantage relative to the high-cost firm is amplified by the manufacturer’s increased bargaining power. Either firm’s production cost improvement can benefit the other. If the firms’ demand functions are asymmetric, an increased customer valuation on the manufacturer’s products benefits the supplier; an increased price sensitivity to demand on the supplier’s products may harm the manufacturer. Moreover, when the supplier sells to two manufacturers, one manufacturer can gain from an increase in the competing manufacturer’s bargaining power.