مدل قیمت گذاری هزینه نهایی معادل برای بازار داغ مرکزی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|13021||2013||9 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Energy Policy, Volume 63, December 2013, Pages 1224–1232
District heating pricing is a core element in reforming the heating market. Existing district heating pricing methods, such as the cost-plus pricing method and the conventional marginal-cost pricing method, cannot simultaneously provide both high efficiency and sufficient investment cost return. To solve this problem, the paper presents a new pricing model, namely Equivalent Marginal Cost Pricing (EMCP) model, which is based on the EVE pricing theory and the unique characteristics of heat products and district heating. The EMCP model uses exergy as the measurement of heating product value and places products from different district heating regions into the same competition platform. In the proposed model, the return on investment cost is closely related to the quoted cost, and within the limitations of the Heating Capacity Cost Reference and the maximum compensated shadow capacity cost, both lower and higher price speculations of heat producers are restricted. Simulation results show that the model can guide heat producers to bid according to their production costs and to provide reasonable returns on investment, which contributes to stimulate the role of price leverage and to promote the optimal allocation of heat resources.
District heating plants can provide higher efficiencies and better pollution control than can localized boilers. They play an important role in the heating market. The heating market is limited to the area that is covered by the local heating district network. The character of the grids as natural monopolies prohibits the construction of parallel networks and, therefore, competition between different heating companies is limited. In certain countries, such as China and Ukraine, the degrees of heating marketization are low and the prices of district heating are regulated strictly (Lukoseviciu, 2008). Because it is regulated, the price of heating is not a guarantee of market efficiency and does not generate energy-saving enthusiasm among heat producers or users. By contrast, other countries, such as Finland and Sweden, have completely liberalized their heating markets and their district heating prices are deregulated. The heating market efficiencies in these countries are improved, but these countries continue to suffer from other problems, such as lower incentives for investment and maintenance (Aronsson and Hellmer, 2009). In certain of these liberalized countries, there have been suggestions to re-regulate the heating markets (Westin and Lagergren, 2002), which create uncertainty in those countries that are liberalizing or preparing to liberalize their heating markets. Much work remains and many problems should be solved before the goals of heating market reform will be achieved. Pricing heating products is at the core of heating market reform. In fact, the pricing is always difficult, whether in the regulation or deregulation of the heating market (Linden and Peltola-Ojala, 2010 and Poredoš and Kitanovski, 2002). The efficiency of the heating market should be considered when establishing the district heating price, in addition to the sufficiency of return on investment cost in heat generation, transition and storage. Many companies, government agencies and researchers have struggled with this problem. In this article, bargaining between the heat producer and the network owner over pricing is discussed and a new method of pricing, the Equivalent Marginal Cost Pricing (EMCP) method, is presented to solve the problems discussed above. The EMCP model uses short-run and long-run marginal costs simultaneously. Based on this method, there is competition among heat producers through bidding for short-run costs, on the one hand, and price regulation from the administration through the Heating Capacity Cost Reference (HCCR), on the other. Competition among heat producers will create a more efficient heating market and the regulation of heating capacity by the administration will lead investment into the heating market. Heating market efficiency and sufficient return on investment may be realized simultaneously with EMCP model. The structure of this paper is as follows. First, representative pricing methods for heating are briefly reviewed. Second, the theory of electricity value equivalent pricing is introduced into the heating market. In the third section, the EMCP model for district heating is presented. A case study is performed thereafter, and we make conclusions in the last section.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
District heating plays an important role in the heating market. As one of the key elements of heating market reform, district heating pricing has been employed as an effective tool to improve the efficiency of the heating market and to promote investment in district heating. The EMCP model is presented here to meet the dual requirements of high market efficiency and sufficient return on investment costs. It is developed from EVE pricing theory and considers the particular characteristics of district heating. In the EMCP model, the value of heating products is measured by exergy, and product costs from different heating district regions are quoted in the same competition platform. The use of exergy provides energy-saving incentives to heat producers and users and offers the possibility of competition for different quality heating products. The placement into districts increases the competition in heating products and promotes reasonable resource allocation among different heating district regions. These help to get high efficiency in heating market. Meanwhile, the competition is regulated with the HCCR and the maximum compensated shadow capacity cost that help to achieve the reasonable and sufficient investment cost return as well as curb speculative behaviors of heat producers. The simulation results confirm that the proposed model has good performance for heating market efficiency, return on investment and economic equity.