در ادغام، چه اتفاقی می افتد؟ مدارک و شواهد از تغییر مالکیت نام تجاری (برند) و سرمایه گذاری تبلیغاتی

We study advertising at the brand level in a sample of corporate acquisitions. New owners display an elevated propensity to sharply cut advertising in acquired brands. This behavior is most pronounced in private equity transactions. When a buyer's existing brands overlap with the acquired brands, aggregate advertising spending on the merged portfolio of brands tends to shift downward. Sharp advertising cuts are more likely to be observed when the old owner of the assets was investing at an elevated level and when the new owner has displayed past restraint in their investment spending activities. Combined buyer and seller abnormal returns are more positive in deals characterized by post-acquisition cuts in advertising, suggesting that these cuts often represent efficiency-enhancing cost savings.

What happens to purchased assets after they are acquired? This is a surprisingly difficult question to answer, as information on acquired assets becomes opaque after the acquired assets are consolidated into a merged organization. Consequently, much of the past evidence on what happens subsequent in an acquisition is indirect. In this paper, we provide direct evidence on some of the consequences of acquisitions by studying a specific type of investment that is available at a very micro level, brand-level advertising. While advertising decisions are important economic choices in their own right, the availability of rich data on these decisions may also provide us with more general insights into post-acquisition spending and investment decisions. The data we exploit is available not only for domestic public firms, but also for private firms and foreign firms. Consequently, we are able to track advertising investment behavior as assets (i.e., brands) move across different types of owners. We find that acquisitions present natural opportunities for significant cost cutting behavior, at least in the case of advertising spending. In particular, new owners display an elevated tendency to sharply cut advertising in acquired brands. While this pattern is evident throughout our sample of acquisitions, it is particularly evident in the case of acquisitions made by private equity acquirers. This finding is consistent with the earlier evidence of Kaplan (1989) and suggests that private equity organizations specialize in cost cutting activities. Turning to other owner characteristics, we find that cuts in brand advertising are particularly elevated in cases in which the buyer's brands and the acquired brands have substantial overlap. This finding suggests that some acquisitions are associated with efficient cost savings that arise from overlapping activities. Large advertising cuts are also more likely if the old owner of the brand was generally investing at a high level and/or if the buyer displays a restrained propensity to invest. This finding suggests that some acquisitions undertaken by public firms may create value by transferring brands to an owner with a more restrained spending style. Complementing these findings, we find that combined buyer/seller deal announcement returns are more positive in deals associated with post-acquisition cuts in advertising spending. Taken as a whole, our evidence supports the hypothesis that corporate control activity has a real effect on how assets are managed, and control events present an opportunity for efficient cost savings by new owners who are in a position to exploit these savings opportunities. Our results are consistent with some of these savings opportunities arising because of new ownership by firms that specialize in efficient cost cutting, notably private equity firms and public firms with restrained investment styles. Additional savings opportunities appear to arise because of efficiencies that are specifically made possible by combining assets under common ownership, most notably cases in which the assets have substantial overlap. These findings complement studies of changes in plant efficiency following control changes (e.g., Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), Schoar (2002)), as efficiency changes can be thought of as the net effect of various operational changes implemented by a new owner. Our study provides direct evidence that some of these operational changes are likely related to investment decisions. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature and outline our empirical strategy. In Section 3, we detail our sample construction and describe the sample. In Section 4, we present our main results on post-acquisition advertising policies. Section 5 concludes.

The evidence we present using rich data on brand-level advertising indicates that corporate acquisitions are often associated with sharp downward revisions in advertising spending. This finding is generally consistent with the presence of efficient cost savings policies implemented by new owners of acquired assets. We find that certain types of owners are particularly likely to engage in cost cutting by decreasing brand advertising. In particular, private equity acquirers are much more likely than others to significantly decrease advertising after an acquisition, suggesting that these organizations specialize in efficient cost cutting activities. When acquired brands overlap with the buyer's existing brands, we find that the entire brand portfolio tends to experience a downward shift in aggregate advertising. This suggests that there are more opportunities for efficient cost cutting in overlapping assets that are brought together in a control transaction. Significant decreases in advertising in acquired brands are also more likely if the old owner displayed a propensity to spend heavily, and also when the new owner has displayed a relatively conservative spending policy. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that acquisitions can at times present opportunities for efficient cost cutting by transferring assets to relatively more restrained spenders. In an effort to directly examine efficiency issues, we consider the market reaction to the announcement of an acquisition as measured by the combined returns of the buyer and the target/seller. These returns are more positive in cases in which post-acquisition brand advertising is curtailed. This is consistent with the hypothesis that cost cutting activities are efficiency enhancing, thus creating value that is anticipated and rewarded by the market. Taken as a whole, our results provide substantial evidence that ownership changes often result in substantive alterations to investment and spending decisions in acquired assets and, at times, in a buyer's pre-existing portfolio of assets. Downward shifts in advertising after an acquisition are common, particularly in situations in which the new owner is likely to specialize in cost cutting activities and/or when the acquisition brings together natural opportunities to eliminate duplicate spending. The indirect evidence we present strongly suggests that cost cutting on the advertising dimension after an acquisition is often efficiency enhancing, and the more direct evidence on announcement returns helps to confirm this interpretation. Thus, a generally healthy picture of control activity emerges.