مقاصد برندینگ در مقابل برندینگ هتل ها در یک مقصد بازی؛ بررسی ماهیت و اهمیت اثرات نام گذاری تجاری شرکت در مطالعه موردی ماکائو

This paper considers destinations and hotels operating within a gaming destination as co-branded experiential choice products. Specifically, it examines the overall and individual effects of visitors’ perceived brand equity of a gaming destination and their perceived brand equity of various hotels, including ‘flagship’ or branded hotels, in terms of influencing their reaction to a hypothetical brand loyalty scenario in which their intended and preferred hotel was unable to provide accommodation thus forcing them to either: (1) choose an alternate hotel in the destination and continue with the visit, (2) cancel the trip and choose another destination to visit, or (3) insist on staying at the preferred hotel but postpone the trip at another period. The study's expectation is that visitors’ response to such a hypothetical scenario is moderated by the relative influence of their perceived brand equity for the destination and for hotels. The emergent gaming destination of Macao is used as a case study for this purpose. The study's findings indicate that visitors’ overall destination brand equity perceptions—rather than hotel brand equity perceptions—is robustly significant when it comes to influencing visitors’ response to the brand loyalty scenario. Results of the study indicate several relevant implications for destination management organizations (DMOs) seeking to enhance their destination-branding efforts and for hotel operators, especially internationally branded hotel chains.

Tourism destinations in the world face keen competition. In their drive to enhance their economy and develop or diversify tourism, many destinations look upon legalized gaming as a means to achieve this, inspired to a great degree by the success of gaming destinations such as Las Vegas as well as emergent ones in Asia. Las Vegas’ short history but rapid rise as an international gaming destination can be attributed in one part to the many casino operators that began establishing and developing their own brand of gaming hospitality which, over time, helped establish Las Vegas as one of the top gaming destinations in tourism. Following this success, several countries in Asia have legalized gaming activities including Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, India, China (Macao and Hong Kong) (Datamonitor, 2009). The Asia-Pacific casino and gaming sector grew by 12.5% in 2008 and reached $92.4 billion in value (Datamonitor, 2009). Forecasted figures indicate that the Asia-Pacific casinos and gaming sector will reach $157.3 billion in value by 2013—an increase of 70.3% over 2008 (Datamonitor, 2009). Macao's particular example has been impressive. A special administrative region of China, Macao has had legalized gaming since the 1950s. But only after the liberalization of its gaming sector and opening the tender for casino operating licenses in 2002 did Macao begin to substantially attract investments in a number of new international casino hotels and resorts. The result of this open policy has been such that within five years gaming revenue in Macao began to eclipse that of Las Vagas. Though Macao's experience is not completely analogous to that of Las Vegas’, there is some parallelism in the way newly established international branded casino hotels and resorts have catalyzed Macao's brand equity as a gaming destination. More recently, Singapore's opening of two new casino hotels and resorts (the Marina Bay Sands and Resorts World Sentosa) manifests a similar strategic goal of diversifying its tourism and attracting more visitors. It seems therefore that in the context of tourism diversification via gaming, destinations rely on bringing in already established and well brand casino hotel and resort operators in order to build a destination's brand equity, in return for favorable investment terms and business climate. The other option for destinations, however, is to devote resources to build up their destination brand equity without the co-branding equity “boost” produced by welcoming established and branded hotel operators. Indeed, it can be argued that the early years of Las Vegas posed precisely this scenario—a desert town with little to offer in terms of visitor attractions which had to be developed from scratch by its now-legendary pioneer operators. But which development path is better? We frame the above problem within the ambit of branding destinations by posing the question: Is it more effective for tourism destinations to “acquire” internationally known or branded hotel operators as a way to build destination brand equity? Or are destinations better off developing their brand equity independently—though not entirely separately—from hotel operators? Does the establishment of an internationally branded hotel in a relatively un-branded destination enhance the latter's brand equity in the mind of visitors? Put another way, are visitors more swayed to visit destinations by the brand equity of hotels operating in the destination or by the destination's own brand equity, or by both acting in concert? We believe these questions to be important to destination marketers. For example, if visitors are more swayed to visit destinations by the brand equity of hotels operations, this may imply that destination marketers can seek help by attracting more international resort companies to improve their tourism. However, if the opposite is true, destination marketers may want to focus more on destinations’ attractiveness rather than attracting international resort operators to invest in the destination. To address these questions, this paper examines the relative influence of a destination's brand equity vis-à-vis hotels’ brand equity in terms of visitors’ reaction, obtained via a survey interview, to a hypothetical scenario in which their intended and preferred hotel was unable to provide them with accommodation and would have to choose between three courses of action: (1) to choose and look for another hotel in the destination, (2) cancel the trip and choose another destination, or (3) postpone the trip to the destination at a period where the preferred hotel has vacancy. The objective is to determine whether visitors’ manifest preference for either the destination or the hotel is, considering one or the other being unavailable, determined by their latent perceptions of brand equity measuring both the destination and hotel. The above research questions are examined within the specific context of gambling destinations, particularly Macao, a once sleepy Portuguese colony known more in the past as a day's excursion destination one hour's ferry ride from Hong Kong but now radically transformed as a the biggest gaming destination in the world.

The above findings lend support to the idea that destination branding appears to be more significant to visitors than the brand equity generated by hotels, especially in the context of gaming destination such as Macao, despite the recent and intense establishment of many international branded hotels, including Las Vegas style mega-resorts or casinos. Faced with a scenario in which their preferred or chosen hotel is unable to provide a room during a planned stay, visitors to Macao indicated a willingness to proceed with their visit as opposed to canceling and choosing another destination or postponing it. It is apparent that this choice is highly explicable by and correlates with visitors’ brand equity perceptions of Macao as a destination, a relationship that seems to stand irrespective of the level of visitors’ brand equity perceptions of their preferred hotel. This finding is intriguing in terms of the separate implications they provide for DMOs and hotel operators, particularly those of gaming destinations. For destinations known narrowly for gaming like Macao, the findings suggest that efforts to diversify leisure options beyond core gaming activities may require more stimulus than just the entry or presence of internationally branded hotels, in order to transcend an already well established destination brand known for gambling. For destinations not principally associated with gambling like Singapore, which only recently did allow gaming to a limited degree, the same hypothesis may perhaps apply and that it will take more time before it sheds the normally sedate associations with its destinations brand. For destinations in general, the significance of this study reiterates the important and vital role DMOs play in developing, managing, and centrally overseeing the destination's brand equity, which theory (Keller, 1993 and Lassar et al., 1995) maintains as being comprised of performance, value, social image, attachment, and trustworthiness dimensions, among others. While the entry or arrival of international brand hotels or other flagship attraction and amenities can do much to boost the brand equity of an otherwise unknown or peripheral destination (Sharpley, 2007), the findings suggest that far more important than the constituent or component attractions operating within a destination, however branded they may be, is how visitors perceive destinations overall as a branded good or experience. For hotel operators in either gaming or non-gaming destinations, the study's findings indicate a need for them to subordinate and align their branding and marketing efforts under the umbrella of the destination in which they operate. By supporting DMO efforts to enhance destination brand equity, hotel operators can benefit more likely than if they were to pursue efforts enhancing only their hotel brands. It must be noted that the study's findings does not diminish in any way the importance of building hotel brand equity perceptions, even if this study showed HBE to be less significant than DBE. It can be posited that HBE would be relevant if a case of a dependent measure indicating visitors’ choice between hotels with varying levels of perceived brand equity were to be the focus of study. One more significance of the study's findings to hotel operators is that it cautions them in terms of establishing operations in destinations that are as yet low in perceived brand equity. It would appear from the findings that having a well-known brand for a hotel would not do much in attracting patrons in a destination with low brand equity characteristics. Future studies should address the impact of destination brand equity on hotels’ brand equity itself, considering that the former seems more consequential in shaping traveler behavior. For example, if a renowned branded hotel establishes in a gaming destination like Macao, is the hotel's global brand equity enhanced or diminished by the Macao's brand equity? The same research problem applies, for example, in the case of “green” hotels setting up in destinations perceived as not environmentally friendly. A unique aspect of this study lies in considering hotels and destinations as co-branded experiences from visitors’ point of view. Although numerous studies exist regarding co-branding products, none prominently and specifically address the context in which this study was designed. Finally, one general contribution of the study lies in questioning the efficacy of indiscriminate co-branding efforts. The findings underscore that two good brands marketed together do not necessarily make a great brand.